Speaker: Mamo Mihretu, Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia, HKS MPA 2009 The Growth Lab worked closely with Mr. Mihretu during our three-year policy engagement in Ethiopia, a country that has established a fragile peace after a devastating civil war. We have studied macroeconomic challenges that the government is trying to address to enable a sustainable post-war recovery. In this talk, Mr. Mihretu discusses the economic reform program currently being implemented in Ethiopia, the challenges they are facing, future prospects and some lessons learned in policymaking.
Today's episode is a recording from our Development Talks – a series of conversations with senior policymakers and academics working in economic development.
In this episode, Mamo Mihretu, Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia and former Harvard Kennedy School student, discusses the economic reform programs currently being implemented in Ethiopia, their challenges, what lies ahead, and some lessons learned in policymaking.
The Growth Lab worked closely with Mr. Mihretu during a three-year policy engagement in Ethiopia, a country that has established a fragile peace after a devastating civil war.
If you'd like to learn more about this work or download the Ethiopia research compendium, visit our site at growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/Ethiopia.
Mamo Mihretu: What I thought I would do is maybe I'll take 15 minutes, 20 minutes. Talk about the economic reform program that we are implementing currently in Ethiopia and the challenge that we're facing, and what the future prospects and maybe what I thought would be useful is also talk a little bit about lessons about policymaking. I mean, the technical thing know, I'm sure the theory and everything you learn it here, but you know, in practical terms it did what you know, how the policies formulated and what are the challenges. And I want to just try to share in a few lessons on that as well. But I think a good place to start would be, as Andy mentioned, to talk a little bit about Ethiopia's economic development gains, because here we are at the public school. You know, let's talk about development. So I think it's very good to start by acknowledging the gains that we've made over the course of the past two decades, before we talk about the challenges. In the past 25 years, Ethiopia made significant progress in terms of development. Our economy has increased significantly over the past 25 years by almost 15 fold. Now, the Egyptian economy is the third largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Next to, I believe, Nigeria and South Africa is the 3rd biggest economy in the African continent. And this is not just growth. This growth was translated into meaningful gains in terms of, for example, human capital, in terms of access to basic services. So it's not just growth. There is also real impact in terms of other indicators, particularly poverty reduction. So, for example, 25 years ago, poverty rate in Ethiopia was close to 46%. Now that has declined to 20%, less than 20%. So there is meaningful progress in that regard as well. Areas of life expectancy over the course of the past 25 years. Life expectancy has we have achieved across the ten years increase in life expectancy. And again, this is not small achievements and it just grows. It is actually affecting the lives of everyone in Ethiopia. In terms of education outcome. If one looks at increasing literacy rate, there is substantial improvement as well. You know, 20 years ago it was close to t27% and now that has improved to 60%. There are also significant improvements in terms of making and access to electricity reachable to Ethiopians, and it increased from 15% now to almost 50%, five zero. And, you know, 50% of our population now have electricity. And that is because of the significant investment that went into the power sector, into the energy sector in Ethiopia. You know, Ethiopia is currently, as you know, building the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, the Grand Renaissance Dam, which is an important project. And that would substantially increase access to electricity, electricity to not just to people in Ethiopia, but also beyond Ethiopia, to the neighboring countries. The project is more or less completed. It's 91% complete. Now, it costs us close to, you know, 5.5 billion USD, and it will be fully completed next year. And when is completely completed, it will generate close to 5000 megawatt energy that would fundamentally transform the energy sector in Ethiopia and in the region. So a significant investment in access to electricity.
Mamo Mihretu: As with the agriculture sector, we've made substantial progress. Most agricultural output and productivity has increased, particularly in maize and wheat. This year, you know, more or less we've achieved with self-sufficiency part of it because of the crisis in Ukraine. You know, you have to look inward inside and we've made substantial effort in terms of mechanization and cluster farming and really inputs supply. And that led to significant improvement in with production. And we are able to travel to achieve self-sufficiency substantially in that regard. So there is substantial development gain over the course of the past ten years. Now, a key question to ask is we know what is the driver of economic growth in Ethiopia over the course of the past two decades? You know, how do we finance our development? I think that's a very important issue. And in our analysis, for most part, the economic success was made possible through mobilization of financial resources for what you consider to be priority sector and public projects. And internally, for most of the projects that we implemented, particularly public infrastructure projects that we implemented, the source of finance was the largest state-owned bank, the commercial bank of Ethiopia, which by far is the biggest financial institution in the country. So we were able to mobilize resources, saving from the public and channel those resources into priority sector and in the public projects. Second thing is we also borrowed significantly from external sources. So there was significant external borrowing, particularly from Chinese development financial institutions. So there was significant borrowing from Chinese EXIM Bank. Some extent it's not as big as China's EXIM Bank, but there is some borrowing from China's development bank as well. So financing, external financing from Chinese Development Bank. In addition to domestic finances, lead to significant increase in public infrastructure projects in Ethiopia. And that led to, as you know, significant growth. And we were able to sustain that growth for a while. But, of course, you know, this model of financing development at some point reached its limit, and that was reflected in the macro imbalances that we experienced. You know, for example, the projects that we financed through domestic finance and external borrowing largely served the domestic economy and didn't generate sufficient foreign currency. And because of that, we had faced some difficulty, you know, some liquidity challenge in terms of servicing our external debt. That was one of the problems that we faced. Second thing is in terms of the finances of budgets, we resorted to monetary financing. So the National Bank of Japan was financing part of the budget deficit. That led to inflationary pressure as well. A third thing because much of the credit in the economy was going to priority sectors and also to the public sector. The growth and the investment for the most part was driven by capital accumulation as opposed to, you know, productivity. Particularly the role and the participation of the private sector in the economy was not significant. Which directly affects our job creation agenda. So we have this problem of access to finance, particularly to the private sector. So this was the problem that we faced, although there was a positive story of development, although there was a positive story of that growth translating into meaningful poverty reduction and a meaningful investment in human capital and public infrastructure projects. At some point it reached its limits. So at that time, you know, coincidentally in Ethiopia, there was a change in government. This is very important to note. Not everything is technical, but there was a change in government. And with the new administration, there was opening and pragmatism to look at things afresh and with new attitude of pragmatism and sort of experimental mindset. There was an opening to confront our problems, particularly the problems that I outlined. And that led to some reflection and some diagnosis to really to develop a strategy and economic reform plan that would address some of the macro imbalances that I described. So what we did at that time was that was some time In 2018, April 2018, we started thinking through, you know, what is it that we are facing and what we should be doing? And a team was formed, you know, from experts, from the Prime Minister's office. At that time. I used to work at the office of the Prime Minister and experts from the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank, jointly. We came up with a strategy of trying to understand today a meaningful diagnosis of our problem. So that process led to the conceptualize of what you called at that time the Homegrown Economic Reform Program. So we developed an economic reform program, sort of medium economic reform program. And the objective of that program was really to address the macro imbalances, including the foreign currency imbalance, the high risk of external debt distress and also vulnerability in the financial sector. Because remember, I was saying that much of the domestic projects in Ethiopia were financed through the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and eventually the inability of the public commercial companies to pay back their debt led to financial sector vulnerability as well. And the high inflation, and lastly, the limited access of credit to the private sector. So those were the challenge that we identified that we told at that time is that we need to find a solution for. So basically, the Homegrown Economic Reform Program that we developed at that time was aimed at addressing these imbalances and these concerns. So we developed the economic reform program, and essentially the reform program, unlike previous programs in Ethiopia, attempted to be comprehensive. We had developed different elements, different pillars to the reform program. The first element of it is to look at the macro issues, you know, what to call the macro pillar of the reform.
Mamo Mihretu: Second thing is to look at the structural issues and third we want to look at the sectoral issues because we want to really look at sectors that are growth enhancing and we want to do additional work in terms of stimulating the productivity of this sector. So as a macro element to it, you know, structural element to it and also central element to it. On the macro front, our goal was, first of all, we want to step up efforts to improve public sector finance. We also did a number of activities to correct the foreign currency imbalance. And at the National Bank, there was effort to modernize the monetary policy framework, which I would explain a little bit. And also strengthening the financial sector, particularly the biggest bank in the country, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. So in regulating the financial sector and effectively towards financial sector, vulnerability was an important part of the reform effort. And finally, we want to develop capital in financial markets broadly. So this where. You know, elements of the reform programs that were clearly outlined that we had a clear strategy for. On the structural reform aspect. Basically, the goal was to try to, first of all, is to let private sector participate in the economy. And we thought we would do that effectively by improving the investment climate in Ethiopia, by addressing regulatory policy, administrative barrier to much robust participation of the private sector in the economy. So there was a broader agenda of improving the investment climate, you know, things like the cutting, the cost of business registration, improving access to credit, you know, generally trying to rationalize and streamline the bureaucracy to support the private sector. Also in Ethiopia, there are two important sectors that would, you know, important play in terms of enabling the private sector. These are the energy sector and the telecom sector. So again, we did we did a lot of work in those two sectors.
Mamo Mihretu: In the telecom for a long time in Ethiopia, there was only one telecom company that was effectively a monopoly in the economy. So we followed the strategy of giving new license to global telecom operators. And also now we are in the process of partially privatizing an incumbent telecom company. The idea would be to support digitization in Ethiopia in that respect were fairly successful. Power sector is an area where there was a lot of investment in Ethiopia. Much of this aid, much of the domestic borrowing and external borrowing goes into constructing new hydro projects. But there was a deal that needed to happen in terms of tariff reform because Ethiopia electricity tariff was cheap. So we want to make the state owned public energy company competitive. So we undertake a tariff reform program which is still continuing. There are also other said sector reform program. So in short. We had a problem that we need to confront. I think we looked at it properly and in response to that, we came up with a different reform program. That was substantially different in terms of its orientation, in terms of its content and in terms of its comprehensiveness. I say that because in terms of in terms of orientation, the goal was to move to what is an economic model that has a healthy balance of private and public participation. In the past it was dominated mainly through public investment. Now we want to increase the participation of the private sector as orientation towards more productivity, towards more active participation of the private sector. By content, I mean we we didn't really confine ourselves in terms of macro reforms to also try to look at structural and sectoral reforms. And by comprehensive and integration. What I was referring is just not to look at, for example, reform of the vehicle sector. We want to integrate the effects of reform with the fiscal reform, with the monetary policy reform, so everything has to tie together. So that kind of approach is what we followed. But of course, you know, having a great plan, perfect plan is the easiest part of, you know, the reform journey. And I'm sure when you go back, whatever you want to go back after finishing, you're still here. You'll immediately see this easy to develop reform program, it's easy to identify what the concepts and the problems are. But when it comes to implementation, all sorts of things happen. I mean, nearly every time you start implementing a reform program, things go. You know differently. Nothing goes according to plan. So I mean, I remember, you know, the sentiment that it had, the images that we had and the ambition and the hope that we had when we developed and conceptualized the reform program. Once we did that. I would say six months in the implementation of the economic reform program.
Mamo Mihretu: All sorts of things happened in Ethiopia and broadly in the world. I mean, the first thing was the COVID pandemic. The COVID pandemic happened six months after the start of the implementation of the reform program. So things that we didn't expect came up. So we have to really think of, you know, what are the risks? What are the unknowns? You know, what with would this reform program go wrong? Should be consistently embedded in your thinking. And that's exactly what happened in our case. So in short you know, after the development of the program, we faced a cocktail of compounding challenges. Something we never expected happen. So like I said, we talked about the COVID pandemic, but some of it are external focus, some are domestic focus. Some are short term by nature. Some are structural. So I would list, for example, you know, the pandemic, the COVID pandemic, and then immediately after that, unfortunate for us in Ethiopia, a very tragic civil conflict and a protracted civil conflict that started immediately after Covid. So that also really, in some respect probably a conflict in, which of course, nobody could really anticipate. And then, of course, the disruption of the global supply chain and transport network. And after COVID globally, you know, China closing down and everything that follows had a significant impact on the Ethiopian economy. Of course, most recently the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its intended impact on the price of fertilizer, on the price of fuel had a significant impact on our economy. And, of course, you know, because we live in the part of the world that's prone to climate shock. We have recurrent droughts. So this long term challenge of climate shock invariably affected us. So this crisis. It will never go away. So, I mean, surely there is a suspicion that we will address it. But I think now we are used to this kind of crisis. So all of this compounding challenges affected the pace of our reform program. So it has it has caused a heavy toll affecting, number one, domestic economic activity. Clearly, it affected prices, but so inflation become a structural and persistent macro challenge in Ethiopia. It affected our budgetary outlays. It affected monetary development. And finally, of course, it's also affected balance of payment. And so there was this this this impact that we have to grapple, we have to confront to try to, you know, take the economy on the growth path. So the impact of these reforms inevitably played out, as I say, in the balance of payment, making the structural reforms and improvements of the policy framework even more urgent. But very, very difficult task. There is buzzword, resilience, you know, building the framework for long term growth. Those things are becoming really, really important because the reality is once you start a new reform program, you know how things turn would be completely different. So this crisis upon crisis had had a significant impact on our reform program despite our initial ambition, given the immense scale of the shocks that we faced. We had to adjust and we have to constantly improvise. For example. You know, once we started the reform program, there was a plan to move towards the powers of fiscal consolidation. But the degree of fiscal consolidation has been less than initially planned due to exceptional spending needs as a result of COVID. And that's in our unique case, is a result of the conflict. So we went exactly opposite direction of what we thought we would achieve.
Mamo Mihretu: So as the reform program. In terms of planned monetary restraint. You know, the goal was to exercise restraint, to have a disciplined monetary stance because we want to address the inflationary pressure. But that was not possible in the context of COVID and because the context of high government domestic financing needs, again, there was shortcoming and the shortfall, in that regard. Of course, balance of payments development deviated sharply from our initial plan, partly because of the conflict, and the conflict lead to a significant deterioration of our external engagement and relationship with international partners. The lack of financing from our international partners, international lenders mean it will have significant impact on our balance of payment return. So I say all that, all of this to say that. This kind of unexpected focus would lead to limited fiscal space. And that inevitably will lead to difficult policy tradeoffs. So do we focus on growth or do you focus on tackling inflation? Or do you focus on achieving financial sector health and stability? I mean, these are difficult issues that have clear trade-offs. And all this happened because of, as I said, unexpected crisis upon crisis that we faced. But having said that, I mean, it's not just a story of, you know, challenged and that we are not in implementing our reforms at all. We also tried our best, you know, to implement reforms that we initially discussed as part of our economic reform programs. I'm going to list a few of them. First thing is, we try to undertake a difficult subsidy reform. So there was wasteful subsidy in the food sector. There was a wasteful subsidy in the oil sector, wasteful subsidy in wheat sector. We more or less, you know, eliminated subsidies in the sectors. And that has a positive impact in terms of minimizing the fiscal risk. We also followed a tight management of new borrowing, and we avoided completely non-concessional debt because, you know, because we really want to address a debt risk. And after this government came into power, we haven't borrowed even a single dollar in terms of an non-concessional loan. And as a result of that result of this, our debt-to-GDP ratio has significantly decreased. So no to commercial loan for the past four years, essentially. Also in terms of fiscal policy. We developed a Treasury bill auction market that was successfully launched and that provided for us the space to develop a market-based system of financing the market. Because in the past, whenever there's a budget deficit, the tendency was to go to the National Bank for monetary financing. So we want to reverse that. And we've developed a Treasury bill market to really follow a market-based financing of the budget.
Mamo Mihretu: We also created new institutions. We developed a new Capital Markets Authority, and we are about to launch and establish a stock exchange in Ethiopia, which would we hope will provide long term finance to companies. So we are creating new institutions in that regard. There was we also created a new entity, the Ethiopian Investment Holdings, which Andy mentioned, which basically because remember, like when you are in the policy space, when you think about growth, you always are constantly thinking about how do I finance growth? You know, what is the source of finance for growth? So one thing is to go to multilateral financial institutions, but this is not really a sustainable way of financing growth. So we need to find out, find out and come up with an imaginative solution to finance growth and our solutions. That would be to establish a new entity that would take all the public commercial companies. And instill discipline, corporate discipline. So is that the value can be generated both just from new investment, but also by better managing existing assets that we have. This can completely transform the economy because so much there is so much value that can be created by changing the way we do things. So we created this entity as a sovereign wealth fund, basically taking all the public commercial companies and properly professionalizing the management of the companies so that value can be created from existing projects. Value can be created from existing operation of companies. Finally, we opened up the banking sector to voting participation, which was really a decisive reform in Ethiopian context simply because the sector was closed forever. And this, we hope, will address long-standing weakness in the scope, depth and accessibility of modern financial services. So it's a sort of challenge, but is a story of resilience because we've taken a number of reforms that we hope would help assist in the growth of the economy. Just quickly, because I don't have time so that's where we are now. This conflict that I told you about is over. You know, we had a sort of peace agreement. Now we are at a stage where we are trying to resume the reform programs that we've started. We are in the phase where we're trying to address long-term structural reform issues. On the back of a peaceful settlement of an active conflict that we had in Ethiopia. And this a good moment really, to deepen those reforms and in doing transform Ethiopian economy and unlock the potential of the economy.
Mamo Mihretu: So my last point, what are the lessons? I'm not talking about economics, but the lessons, practical lessons. Maybe I'll try to talk about three important lessons. First thing is, in the context of developed markets. When you think of reform, it's driving the car. Just think of car as an institution is driving a car using existing levers such as the levers of the machine to optimize across variables. But in the context of a developing country, when you think of reform, it's not just driving a car. It's actually like building the car, as you drive on the road, that's not fully completed, while you are arguing with your spouse about the direction. This is a complicated thing, so it's not like you are working on an existing system in the process. You have to actually build the institution itself and in this case, the car. And it's not like there is a shared understanding of what the reform would be. You have to constantly discuss and engage with different parties. So it's really important to talk about not only the technical part of the reform. I think we need to you need to think about how do you mobilize people around you, how do you engage with other people? So take courses in group dynamics, you know, take leadership that's very important for MPA/ID students. Second thing is and is the second thing is, you know, policymakers need to know how to sit with ambiguity and uncertainty. You know, not everything will pick up and not everything becomes clear immediately. So I think it's very we need to have the stomach to observe.
Mamo Mihretu: And just 2 minutes and I'll finish. So to to really absorb and sit with ambiguity and conflict within the group less internally as with. So I think this is an important skill develop. Not everything becomes clear immediately. So I think living with uncertainty, living with ambiguity would be an important skill to have. Something I would say is, you know, most of the problems that we face in developing countries by nature are complex problems. So do not believe anybody who says they have an easy solution for the problems that we are facing. There is no easy solution that some to take solution calculation. And I think it's very, very important that we learn how to work in a group and that we realize that, you know, most of these issues can be addressed through collective efforts. And you talk about, you know, before, you know, this sense of us, you know, having a sort of a shared understanding, that's very, very critical because if people are not, we use very, very difficult to solve this problem and most of these things will not solve immediately. It will take significant amount of time. So we can only solve them through time. So in some ways, you know, in our in my experience, solving developmental challenges is a process. It's a journey, and it's also a process of both conservation and the process of change. So that is element of conserving what you've have achieved. And there's also note of change because in our case, for example, we tried to build on the past gains. You know, we didn't really try to sit everything out. So I mean, there was significant progress that had been in the past, but we tried to, you know, identify in areas where that needs correction and we build on it and we try to change it so that it's keeping it and plus changing it is an important part of a reform program. And I think it's very important to keep systems in the sense of us, particularly in the countries that is very, very critical. I mean, we try to, you know, start big massive public projects such as the Grand Renaissance Dam. We started the project like, you know, Green Legacy Project. We are planting close to 5 million trees.
Mamo Mihretu: All these projects, in addition to their economic value will be important in terms of forging that sense of us, that sense of that we are in this together and that we will do this together. So in in some ways, the development process is not just a technical process. The development process is a political process because you have to bring people together with you to be able to make progress. Finally, I think it's very important to realize and the that crisis will never leave us. You know, we are constantly confronting one crisis after another crisis, and I think we have to be comfortable with living with the crisis. And I think the critical thing is to try to build the foundation for future resilient growth so solving crises will not be possible. And finally, as public servants, as leaders in the public space, we need to have experimental mindset because, you know, when you develop our economic reform program, we never thought that, you know, all this thing will go wrong. But the reality is everything went wrong. So in those cases, I think the most important skill to have is to try to, you know, to learn how to improvise, you know, try to learn how to adapt, to make change here and there so that, you know, your ultimate objective with escrows was poverty reduction. That is just, you know, whatever it is, you can stay on the course. I think experimental mindset you're trying to do to make decisions, learning from them and really trying to build a resilient system would be an important part of this. And there are more lessons to leave, but I think my last thing would be I that my biggest thing would be development, you know, just not a technical process. It's a political process. You have to learn how to work with other people. You have to learn how to work people who have differing viewpoint than you. I think that would be an important skill to have. Again, thank you so much.